论坛活动

时 间

2025年12月24日（周三）上午10:00-11:30

地 点

中国人民大学中关村校区明德主楼801

主办单位

国家金融研究院、中国人民大学财政金融学院

主讲嘉宾简介

Maggie Rong Hu教授现任纽约市立大学巴鲁克学院齐克林商学院房地产系助理教授。她于2013年获得新加坡国立大学金融学博士学位，并于2008年取得该校工程学学士学位。她主要研究领域涵盖房地产金融与经济学、家庭金融、金融科技及实证公司金融。其研究成果已发表于American Economics Review, Management Science, Information Systems Research, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Review of Finance, Real Estate Economics等国际权威期刊，并多次在顶尖国际会议中荣获最佳论文奖，屡获竞争性科研资助。

沙龙内容摘要

we study strategic bid manipulation in high-stakes online housing auctions using comprehensive data from China' s judicial foreclosure market, the world' s largest court-administered auction platform. We identify suspected shill bidders-participants who inflate prices without intent to purchase using granular bid timing, frequency, and response speed. Shill bidders appear in 8% of auctions and increase transaction price premiums by 14.3%, implying an annual wealth transfer of approximately USD 80 million from buyers to judgment debtors. We establish causality using a quasi-experimental regulatory shock introduced by the Jiangsu High People's Court in 2017, which sharply increased penalties for defaulting bidders. Difference-in-differences estimates show that price premiums decline by 8.2% in treated courts following the reform, alongside a 14-20% reduction in shill activity. Instrumental variable estimates using city-level dishonest judgment debtor cases further corroborate the causal effect. Mechanism analysis reveals that shill bidders intensify competition among genuine bidders: auctions with shills exhibit higher bid frequency, faster bidding speeds, lower concentration, and more aggressive outbidding. The impact of shill bidding is attenuated by higher deposits, stronger legal institutions, and closer court proximity, but amplified in high-trust and high-fraud regions. Our results provide the first large-scale causal evidence on auction fraud in judicial housing markets and highlight how weak enforcement in digital market design can generate large and hidden welfare losses. The findings offer direct guidance for platform design and judicial enforcement in online asset markets.