论坛活动

时 间

2026年4月23日（周四）下午16:30-18:00

地 点

中国人民大学中关村校区 明德主楼801

主办单位

国家金融研究院、中国人民大学财政金融学院

主讲嘉宾简介

陆卓然，上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院助理教授。研究方向涵盖契约理论、信息经济学、组织经济学、网络经济学与数字经济，重点关注信号产品的最优定价、基于网络结构的契约设计以及数字经济中的关系型契约。相关研究发表于Journal of Economic Theory和MIS Quarterly。曾主持国家自然科学基金青年项目，并参与国家自然科学基金重大项目和专项项目。研究成果曾获中国信息经济学2025创新论文奖等多项国内外学术奖励。

沙龙内容摘要

The rise of the Internet of Things (loT) and big data technologies enables insurance companies to monitor policyholders' behavior in real time, leading to innovative usage-based insurance (UBI). This paper studies the optimal UBI contract that employs both a traditional objective signal (e.g., official accident report) and a novel subjective signal (e.g., driver safety score) about the insured's behavior in the presence of moral hazard. We show that under limited liability, the subjective signal may not be used even when enforceable if it is relatively imprecise. Moreover, the objective and subjective signals can serve as either complements or substitutes, depending on their precisions. While a more precise subjective signal always enhances insurance market efficiency, the welfare implication of the objective signal can be non-monotonic. In particular, when a more precise objective signal leads to a highly efficient traditional insurance contract, it may reduce the efficiency of the UBI contract or even make the subjective signal infeasible to use. Our paper thus explains the conditions under which UBI programs can emerge and highlights key factors for the success of UBI programs. In addition, we show that UBI market regulation can mitigate distortions in UBI contract design and investment in monitoring technologies.