论坛活动

时 间

2026年4月13日（周一）上午10:00-11:30

地 点

中国人民大学中关村校区明德主楼801

主办单位

国家金融研究院、中国人民大学财政金融学院

主讲嘉宾简介

杨明是伦敦大学学院经济与金融学副教授。他的研究领域主要包括金融学、经济学和会计学中的策略性信息获取和披露。特别地，他研究公司金融中保密设计和信息获取的相互影响、信息获取和披露在促进协调中的作用、激励合同和监督、会计和最优信息披露等等。他的研究发表在Review of Economic Studies, the Review of Financial Studies, Journal of Economic Theory, Theoretical Economics, the Journal of Accounting and Economics和Management Science等国际顶级期刊上。

沙龙内容摘要

We develop a dynamic contracting framework to study how partial commitment power affects long-term employment relationships. In a continuous-time moral hazard model, the principal can alter the contract at random, exogenously timed"alteration opportunities," with the arrival rate measuring her (lack of) commitment power. Our results depend on the relative observability of diligence and misconduct. For guardian jobs, where misconduct is easier to observe, it is optimal to offer a static, permanent contract that pays fixed performance bonuses for observed diligence and remains immune to reductions in commitment power. For entrepreneurial jobs, where diligence is easier to observe, the optimal structure features an initial probation period, a promotion bonus upon achieving permanence, and a return to probation at each alteration opportunity. In this case, weaker commitment can, under certain conditions, improve welfare; if commitment power is already low, further reductions may yield Pareto improvements. Reduced commitment power also raises required promotion and performance bonuses, shortens probation, and accelerates the decline in promotion bonuses over time.