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主讲嘉宾简介

戴亮于2015年在美国普林斯顿大学获得经济学博士学位，2015-2023年任教于上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院，先后任助理教授、副教授，2023年10月至今任香港中文大学（深圳）经管学院助理教授，主要研究方向为微观经济学理论和金融学，研究成果发表于Journal of Economic Theory, Review of Financial Studies等国际一流期刊。

沙龙内容摘要

A principal ("she") monitors an agent's("his") hidden action by allocating attention to observe his performance publicly; however, her own attention allocation is also her hidden action that she cannot commit to, leading to a double moral hazard problem. We study this problem in an infinite-horizon model where the principal can commit to the compensation scheme to varying degrees, but not to the monitoring scheme. We show that the optimal contract is a fixed wage paired with termination upon publicly observed bad performance, regardless of the degree of commitment in compensation. Introducing a minimal commitment to monitoring yields a more efficient contract by rewarding publicly observed good performance, thereby strengthening the agent's incentives, lowering his continuation value, and improving the principal's payoff. These findings offer a novel perspective on the prevalence of fixed-wage contracts in practice and how it may relate to limited commitment power in monitoring.

时 间

2025年10月30日周四上午10:00-11:30

地 点

中国人民大学中关村校区明德主楼701

主办单位

国家金融研究院、中国人民大学财政金融学院货币金融系