论坛活动

时 间

2026年5月13日（周三）上午10:00-11:30

地 点

中国人民大学中关村校区明德主楼801

主办单位

国家金融研究院、中国人民大学财政金融学院

主讲嘉宾简介

喻洋，上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院副教授。博士毕业于美国杜克大学。其研究领域涵盖宏观经济学、中国金融市场、劳动经济学及技术创新。研究成果发表于国际知名期刊，包括Review of Economic Studies，Management Science, Journal of Monetary Economics, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis。主持国家青年人才项目。

沙龙内容摘要

This paper studies the conditions for the political enactment of industrial policy and how they compare with the welfare criterion of a social planner. We develop a two-sector model integrating learning-by-doing, inter-sectoral spillovers, technological synergies, and labor market monopsony within an explicit voting framework. The model shows that policies supported by the taxed majority is strictly smaller than the set of policies that improve aggregate welfare, opening the possibility that welfare-improving policies fail to receive majoritarian support. The political enactment of welfare-improving policies requires strong inter-sectoral learning spillovers, low synergy costs, and a small subsidized sector. Monopsony power in the beneficiary sector enhances political support from workers in the rest of the economy who benefit through increased dividend income that partially offset their tax contribution to support industrial policy. Using novel U.S. firm-level data on customer-supplier relationships for the period 1976-2020, we validate our framework.